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Abstract 
This paper estimates the effects of several German labor market programs – starting in March 
2003 – on the employment outcomes of participants using propensity score matching. The 
main objective is to compare estimated average treatment effects for treatment and compari-
son groups, which vary in the choice of the classification window that defines treatment and 
non-treatment. The first approach does not put any restrictions on the future of the treated as 
well as of the comparison group. This approach has become more and more common in the 
evaluation of European labor market policies. In contrast, the second approach considers only 
potential comparison group members, who have not entered any labor market program during 
the entire observation period of 3 ½ years. The third approach additionally restricts itself to 
participants, who have not participated in further labor market programs during the observa-
tion period. The results differ considerably; program effectiveness is estimated to be much 
lower using the second approach. The paper highlights the fact that program careers are a 
non-trivial issue that deserves more attention in future research. 
 
JEL classification: J68, J64, J65 
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1  Introduction 
During 2006, the German Public Employment Service (“Bundesagentur für Arbeit”) and the 
German government spent 18.5 billion Euros on active and 46.8 billions on passive labor mar-
ket policies (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006). The question, whether the considerable funds 
devoted to active labor market policies have been used effectively gains more and more atten-
tion in Germany. An increasing number of careful evaluation studies investigate the effective-
ness of labor market programs in Germany. Starting with large evaluation projects on public 
job creation schemes (see for instance Caliendo et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and further voca-
tional training measures (see for instance Fitzenberger et al. 2006, Fitzenberger/Völter 2007, 
Lechner et al. 2005, 2007a), a further step was reached with the comprehensive evaluation of 
the so called “Hartz” reforms of German labor market policies. This huge evaluation project 
involved the majority of German socio-economic research institutes and has been supervised 
by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS). Furthermore, the German Public 
Employment Service started the TrEffeR-project (Treatment Effects and Prediction) to develop 
its own evaluation and monitoring tool (Stephan et al. 2006). 
This paper adds to this literature by analyzing empirically a particular aspect – the definition 
of non-participation – arising in evaluation studies that utilize non-experimental data. For 
participants in five active labor market programs, starting during March 2003, I apply statisti-
cal matching techniques to estimate program effects on cumulated days spent in regular em-
ployment during the 3 ½ years after program entry. I compare the results for a very narrow 
and a very wide “classification window” defining non-treatment.  
In the former case all persons are categorized as non-treated who did not enter a program 
during March 2003, while they may be “waiting” to participate at a later date. In the latter 
case the non-treatment group consists of persons who have never been in any program during 
the entire observation period of 3 ½ years. Additional estimates also include only participants, 
who did not join any further labor market program during the observation period. This is no 
minor issue, since typically around 40 to 50 percent of comparison group members and around 
50 to 70 percent of those taking-up a program in March 2003 also participated in at least one 
(further) program starting after March 2003. 
A similar analysis has been conducted by Steiger (2004) for Switzerland, who did, however, not 
distinguish between different labor market programs. Her main result was that participation is 
much more effective compared to “waiting” than compared to “never in any program”.  
A recent example for the possible importance of the topic is provided by three studies of Ger-
man  further  vocational  training  programs,  covering  program  entries  from  2000  to  2002: 
Wunsch/Lechner (2008) estimated that further vocational training – and other programs – had 
generally negative or insignificant effects on employment probabilities of participants and 
their cumulated days spent in regular employment 30 months after program start. Small posi-
tive effects were found for few subgroups of participants only. This was taken up by a German  
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newspaper  claiming  that  active  labor  market  policy  in  Germany  wastes  billions  of  Euros 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 28, 2007). Biewen et al. (2007) point out that – also 
30 months after program start – they found positive effects of further vocational training with 
short or medium duration on the employment prospects of certain subgroups in West Ger-
many. Rinne et al (2007), who investigated entries in further vocational training programs of 
medium duration during 2002, obtained – two years after program start – even positive effects 
on employment probabilities for all subgroups investigated. 
One of the underlying reasons might be that Wunsch/Lechner (2008) “define participants as 
unemployed who participate at least once in a program in the 18 months following the inflow 
date into our sample. Accordingly, non-participants are all persons who do not enter a pro-
gram during this period.” (p. 143). Thus “non-treatment” requires that no treatment has oc-
curred up to a period of 18 months after entry into unemployment. Biewen et al. (2007) per-
form separate estimates by duration of unemployment at the beginning of a treatment (up to 
three months, four to six months, seven to twelve months of unemployment) and require only 
that non-participants have not entered a measure during an accordingly chosen classification 
window of three or six months. Rinne et al. (2007) stratify estimates by duration of unem-
ployment in months and require that non-participants had not taken-up the same type of 
training program before and during the quarter of the participant’s program entry (p. 10). Sen-
sitivity analysis conducted by these authors (Section 4.4 of their paper) showed also that esti-
mated  program  effects  decreased  considerably  if  they  use  a  similar  definition  of  non-
treatment than Wunsch/Lechner (2008) did. 
The  following  Section  2  briefly  describes  German  active  labor  market  policies  and  recent 
evaluation results. Section 3 discusses the evaluation problem investigated. Section 4 intro-
duces data, variables and the particular method and evaluation design used. The empirical 
results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 lists the conclusions. 
2  Active labor market policies in Germany and recent evaluation 
results 
The “Hartz” reforms, enacted in 2002, caused a fundamental revision of active and passive 
labor market policies in Germany: Since 2003 the design of several active measures was modi-
fied and a number of new instruments were introduced. Regarding passive labor market poli-
cies, since 2005 former unemployment assistance for long-term unemployed persons and for-
mer social assistance has been merged into a new variant of basic social care for needy em-
ployable persons. 
This section gives a short overview of the main instruments of active labor market policies in 
Germany. Furthermore, results from selected recent evaluation studies on the effectiveness of 
active labor market policies in Germany will be sketched. Most of these studies are based on 
statistical  matching  techniques,  while  a  few  apply  duration  analysis.  Statistical  matching 
techniques compare a group of treated individuals with a selected group of similar, but un- 
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treated comparison persons; the estimated program effect is then simply given by the differ-
ence in outcome variables – mostly employment rates – between the two groups (see Section 
3 for more details). Duration analysis parametrically estimates the effect of treatment on the 
“risk” of entering employment or leaving unemployment. The increasingly popular timing-of-
events model (Abbring/van den Berg 2003, 2004) additionally takes into account the risk of 
entering a program during an unemployment spell.  
Table 1 shows entries and populations in selected programs of active labor market policies 
administered by the German Public Employment Service for the period 2000 to 2006. The em-
pirical results presented in section 5 in this paper restrict themselves to short programs up to 
six months duration and include variants of further vocational training, short-term training 
measures, wage subsidies and public job creation schemes. 
Table 1 
Entries and average stock of participants in selected labor market programs (in 1000) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entries
Further vocational training (“Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung”) 523 442 455 255 185 132 247
Short-term training (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”) 485 551 865 1064 1188 894 978
Wage subsidy (“Eingliederungszuschüsse”) 152 127 188 183 157 134 217
Start-up subsidy I (“Überbrückungsgeld”) 93 96 125 159 183 157 108
Start-up subsidy II (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”) - - - 95 168 91 43
Public job creation I (“Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM”) 318 246 215 179 161 80 80
Public job creation II (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten”) - - - - - 630 742
Contracting-out to private placement agencies ("Beauftragung  Dritter")* - - - - 635 426 301
Temporary help-firms ("Personal-Service-Agenturen") - - - 45 56 27 16
Average stock of participants
Further vocational training (“Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung”) 343 352 340 260 184 114 119
Short-term training (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”) 52 60 74 93 95 69 70
Start-up subsidy I (“Überbrückungsgeld”) 105 118 136 153 110 60 82
Start-up subsidy II (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”) 43 46 56 73 84 83 63
Start-up subsidy (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”) - - - 40 151 234 210
Public job creation I (“Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM”) 266 237 193 144 117 61 50
Public job creation II (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten”) - - - - - 201 293
Contracting-out to private placement agencies ("Beauftragung  Dritter")* - - - - 95 103 100
Temporary help-firms ("Personal-Service-Agenturen") - - - 10 25 13 6  
*)  Figures are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out of subtasks) 
respectively 2002 (contracting-out of entire placement). 
Source:  Statistics of the German Public Employment Service (Date-Warehouse). 
 
For a long time so called “further” vocational training (“Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung”) 
belonged to the most important programs in Germany. It encompasses a range of different 
treatments, which can be broadly classified in qualification programs, training within “practice 
firms” (that offer practical occupational training without trainees actually working in a real 
company) and long retraining programs. However, during the first half of this decade entries 
as well as the duration of these measures were shrinking, whereas the number of entries in-
creased again in 2006. The effectiveness of these programs has been analyzed in a consider-
able number of studies applying statistical matching techniques. Lechner et al. (2005, 2007a)  
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investigated program entries during the years 1993 and 1994, their observation period covers 
about seven years after program start. Fitzenberger et al. (2006) analyze program entries in-
flows  in  unemployment  during  the  years  1986/87  and  1993/94  in  West  Germany,  while 
Fitzenberger/Völter (2007) focus on unemployment entries during 1993/94 in East Germany. 
Generally, these studies obtained the result that – in the longer run – further vocational train-
ing programs had mostly significant positive effects on the employment prospects of partici-
pants. However, since program effects are rather weak, it may take some years until the esti-
mated program effect turns positive. More recent program entries have been investigated by 
Biewen et al. (2007), Rinne et al. (2007) and Wunsch/Lechner (2008), who analyzed programs 
starting in the years 2000 to 2002. As has already been mentioned in the introduction, the 
estimates of Wunsch/Lechner indicated no positive effects of further vocational training on 
employment prospects of participants in West Germany. In contrast, Biewen et al. found posi-
tive effects for programs of short and medium duration in West Germany (but not in East 
Germany) and particular groups of unemployed. Also Rinne et al. (2007) estimated positive 
effects of participation in medium length programs on the employment probabilities of par-
ticipants in all subgroups investigated. Hujer et al. (2006b) applied duration analysis to East 
German data from the years 1999 to 2002 – their result was that participation in further vo-
cational training prolonged unemployment duration. 
Short-term training programs (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”), whose duration does in most cases not 
exceed two months, have been increasing in number in particular during 2003 and 2004. These 
short-term measures are utilized to train qualifications and abilities (firm-internal and firm-
external), to test the availability of unemployed persons, to check whether unemployed are 
suited for further longer-term measures and to provide job search assistance through applica-
tion training. These short-term measures have been analyzed also in the already cited studies 
of Biewen et al. (2007) and Wunsch/Lechner (2008). Similar to further vocational training, 
Biewen et al. find mostly positive and Wunsch/Lechner found insignificant effects of short 
training-programs. Hujer et al. (2006a) showed – using duration analysis – that the risk of 
entering employment is significantly higher for individuals participating in a short-training 
program. These studies, however, do not take into account the substantial heterogeneity of 
this class of programs. Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) distinguished between short classroom training 
and short training within firms for individuals; they investigated the effect on the employment 
prospects  of  unemployed  receiving  means-tested  unemployment  benefits  (“Arbeitslosen-
geld II”). They obtained the result that both variants have positive effects, which are much 
larger for short training within firms. These are, however, also much more prone to deadweight 
losses. Büttner (2007) used data from a social experiment on short-training programs to test 
the availability of the unemployed. He showed that it is the notification of treatment rather 
than participation that had an effect on leaving unemployment. 
A number of programs foster a direct integration of the unemployed in the first labor market. 
Of particular importance are a variant of targeted wage subsidies (“Eingliederungszuschüsse”), 
paid to employers for a fixed period of time. They gained importance first in East Germany  
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following the reunification and thereafter again in the late nineties, but lost importance until 
2005, like further vocational training schemes. From 1998 to 2003 three variants were in 
place: One was characterized by a rather low level of targeting, while one was aimed at hard-
to-place unemployed with severe problems of reintegration and one at workers of age 50 and 
older. The “Hartz” reforms collapsed these into a single wage subsidy for hard-to-place work-
ers, with a looser definition of target groups and less generous financial support. Jaenichen/ 
Stephan (2007) estimated average treatment effects of a subsidy on previously unemployed 
hard-to-place individuals. In line with the international literature on wage subsidies, they 
showed that subsidies have a favorable effect on the employment prospects of participants. 
Boockmann et al. (2007) utilized a “natural experiment”: They computed the effect of changes 
in the legislation on wage subsidies for older workers on the employment prospects of this 
group, using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare changes in transition probabili-
ties between the affected group and a comparison group comprised of slightly younger work-
ers. The authors found nearly no significant effects and concluded that deadweight effects 
- those subsidized would have been hired anyway - are a major problem of wage subsidies.  
Two programs offering financial support for unemployed persons founding their own busi-
nesses grew in numbers until 2006. A first variant (“Überbrückungsgeld”) encouraged unem-
ployed persons to start-up a new business by proceeding to pay unemployment benefits as 
well as a subsidy to social security contributions for six months. The “Hartz” reforms in 2003 
additionally introduced a second variant of a start-up subsidy (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”), 
which provided a fixed, but time-decreasing amount for up to three years and was attractive 
for unemployed persons who received comparatively few unemployment benefits. In August 
2006 both programs were collapsed in a new variant of a start-up subsidy (“Gründungszu-
schuss”). Baumgartner/Caliendo (2007) analyzed the effect of both previous variants on unem-
ployed persons, who founded a subsidized business in 2003. Their results showed that unem-
ployment rates were lower 28 months after program start and rates of regular employment or 
self-employment were significantly higher across those subsidized than in an unsubsidized 
comparison group. 
Previously  very  important  programs  for  job  creation  in  the  public  sector  (“Arbeitsbeschaf-
fungsmaßnahmen und Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen”) nearly disappeared until 2004. How-
ever, since 2005 a new variant of public job creation for long-term unemployed (“Arbeits-
gelegenheiten”) is the most important program for unemployed receiving social basic care. The 
latter  provide  mostly  only  a  modest  additional  reimbursement  for  work  (“Ein-Euro-Jobs”). 
Caliendo et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2006) and Hujer/Thomsen (2006c) investigated entries into 
public job creation schemes in 2000, using the matching method. They estimated heterogene-
ous effects on participants, which are in the longer-run mostly negative or insignificant. Ex-
ceptions are long-term unemployed, highly qualified men and older women in West Germany. 
Hujer/Zeiss (2006d) evaluated these programs in East Germany schemes also with the timing-
of-events method. Their main conclusion is that participation in these schemes increased indi-
vidual unemployment duration of participants. Recent results on the new “One-Euro-Jobs”  
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(Hohmeyer/Wolff 2007), introduced in 2005, highlighted the effect heterogeneity of this pro-
gram. The authors found slightly positive effects in particular for participants from West Ger-
many and individuals out of regular employment for a longer time period.  
Contracting-out to private placement services gained importance during the last years in Ger-
many. On the one hand unemployed persons may be assigned to private agencies that compete 
on a quasi-market (“Beauftragung privater Dritter”). On the other hand unemployed persons 
may ask for a voucher that entitles them to use the services of a private placement agency. 
Also temporary help firms may employ previous unemployed persons, while receiving financial 
reimbursement by the Public Employment Service (“Personal-Service-Agenturen”). Using sta-
tistical matching methods, Winterhager (2008) showed that most subgroups of unemployed 
persons contracted out to private placement agencies in 2004 did not experience an increase 
in employment prospects during a period of nine months after treatment start. For unem-
ployed persons receiving basic social care and contracted-out at the beginning of 2005, Bern-
hard/Wolff  (2008)  obtained evidence of slightly positive effects of contracting-out on the 
employment prospects two years later. Winterhager et al. (2006) found positive treatment 
effects on the employment probability of individuals who received a job voucher during May 
and June 2003; Hess et al. (2006) identified no positive effects of employment in a temporary 
help firm on the latter likelihood of being in a regular job. 
A  number  of  studies  (for  instance  Lechner  et  al.  2005,  2007a,  Jaenichen/Stephan  2007) 
showed that estimated treatment effects of labor market programs are more positive for the 
outcome variable “regular employment” than for the outcome variable “not unemployed”. Both 
outcome variables may differ since not every person avoiding unemployment has to be regu-
larly employed – several persons might withdraw temporarily or permanently from the labor 
force (another option might for instance be to take up unsubsidized self-employment). The 
observed difference between both outcome variables results from the fact that a higher share 
of the comparison group than of the treatment group withdraws from the labor force. Thus 
one effect of the participation in labor market programs might be to activate individuals who 
would otherwise have withdrawn from the labor market. 
Since the main topic of the paper is the classification window underlying definitions of non-
treatment using statistical matching techniques, Overview 1 summarizes selected information 
on several studies cited above. The “maximum restriction” in the last column shows how long 
after program start of a treated person its matched comparison person may not be “allowed” 
to enter a program. It depends first on the time window over which treatments are sampled: If 
program entry occurs at the beginning of this time window the maximum restriction applies, 
while the restriction is not binding if a program is taken up at the end of this time window. It 
depends second on the decision to stratify the sample by duration of unemployment: If the 
sample is stratified, the restriction occurs only within each strata. Authors applying no stratifi-
cation typically condition their choice of comparison groups on duration of unemployment.  
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Overview 1 
Definitions of treatment and non-treatment in selected recent studies for Germany 
Study Sampling condition Definition of treatment Definition of non-treatment
Maximal 
restriction
Baumgartner/Caliendo (2007)  Unemployed during the 3rd quarter of 2003 Program entry during 3rd quarter of 2003 No program entry during 3rd quarter of 2003 3 months
Bernhard/Wolff (2008)
Unemployed recipients of basic social care for 
jobseekers at January 31, 2005
Program entry from 2/2005 to 4/2005
No entry into the program investigated from 2/2005 to 
4/2005
3 months*
Biewen et al. (2007) Inflow into unemployment from 2/2000 to 1/2002
First program entry within 12 months after 
unemployment entry, stratified by unemployment 
duration (0-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-12 months)
No program entry while in particular unemployment 
strata
3 or 6 months
Caliendo et al. (2005a)  Unemployed during 1/2000 Program entry during 2/2000 No program entry during 2/2000 1 month
Caliendo et al. (2005b)  Unemployed during 1/2000 Program entry during 2/2000 No program entry during 2/2000 1 month
Caliendo et al. (2006)  Unemployed during 1/2000 Program entry during 2/2000 No program entry during 2/2000 1 month
Fitzenberger et al. (2006)
Inflow into unemployment during 1986/87 and 
1993/94 (West Germany)
First program entry within two years after 
unemployment entry, stratified by unemployment 
duration (1-2 quarters, 3-4 quarters, 5-8 quarters)
No program entry while in particular unemployment 
strata
6 or 12 months
Fitzenberger/Völter (2007) 
Inflow into unemployment during 1993/94 (East 
Germany)
First program entry within two years after 
unemployment entry, stratified by unemployment 
duration (1-2 quarters, 3-4 quarters, 5-8 quarters)
No program entry while in particular unemployment 
strata
6 or 12 months
Hohmeyer/Wolff (2007)
Unemployed recipients of basic social care for 
jobseekers at Januar 31, 2005
Program entry from 2/2005 to 4/2005




Unemployed during 6/2000, 8/2000, 10/2000, 12/2000, 
2/2001 and 4/2001
Program entry during 7/2000, 9/2000, 11/2000, 
1/2001, 3/2001 and 5/2001, stratified by 
unemployment duration (1, 2,…12 quarters)
No program entry while in particular unemployment 
strata
3 months
Jaenichen/Stephan (2007) Unemployed during the 2rd quarter of 2002 First program entry during  2nd quarter of 2002 No program entry during 2nd quarter of 2002 3 months
Lechner et al. (2005)
Inflow into unemployment during 1993/94 (West 
Germany)
First program entry during 1993/94 No program entry until 1995 24 months
Lechner et al. (2007)
Inflow into unemployment during 1993/94 (East 
Germany)
First program entry during 1993/94 No program entry until 1995 24 months
Rinne et al. (2007) Unemployed during 2002
Program entry during 2002, stratified by 
unemployment duration (in months) and quarter of 
program entry
No entry into the program investigated  before and 
during the quarter of program entry while in particular 
unemployment strata
3 months*
Winterhager et al. (2006)  Unemployed during 5/2003 or 6/2003 Receipt of a voucher during 5/2003 or 6/2003 No receipt of a voucher until 6/2004 12 months
Wolff/Jozwiak (2007)
Unemployed recipients of basic social care for 
jobseekers at Januar 31, 2005
Program entry from 2/2005 to 4/2005




Inflow into unemployment during 1/2000 to 12/2002 
(West Germany)
First program entry during the 18 months after inflow 
into unemployment and before 2003




Note: See Section 2 for information on the instruments investigated and the main results. 
*) Restriction applies only to the program investigated. 
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Note finally that for instance Lechner et al. (2005, 2007a) use a rather wide participation win-
dow, but assigned for each non-participant a hypothetical starting date, drawn from the dis-
tribution of observed starting dates of treatment. To obtain comparable samples of partici-
pants and non-participants, all non-participants who were already employed at this date were 
then excluded from further analysis. However, Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2007, Footnote 11) 
criticize this approach for adding additional noise to the data. 
3  The evaluation problem 
The majority of micro studies using non-experimental data estimate average treatment effect 
on the treated (Heckman et al. 1999). In our case this implies estimating the average effect of 
participation in active labor market programs on subsequent days spent in regular employ-
ment. I will first sketch the framework and then introduce a classification window for the 
definition of non-treatment. 
Let D = 0 indicate that no measure has started during a certain time interval in calendar time 
(in the empirical analysis this will be March 2003), while D = 1 indicates that an entry in a 
particular labor market program took place. The effectiveness of the treatment is measured by 
the  outcome  variable  Y,  which  takes  the  value  Y1  under  treatment  and  Y0  under  non-
treatment. Independent of the exact definition of non-treatment, we observe either Y0 or Y1 
for each individual. If the program does not have effects on the labor market outcomes of 
non-participants – this is the „Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption“ (SUTVA) – the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is very generally given by 
(1)  DATT = E(Y1 – Y0 | D =1) = E(Y1 | D =1) – E(Y0 | (D = 1) 
While we observe E(Y1 | D = 1), the average outcome of the treated with treatment, we cannot 
observe the average outcome of the treated without treatment E(Y0 | D = 1). Using non-
experimental data one thus has to find a comparison group of non-treated individuals to im-
pute the counterfactual outcome of the treated without treatment (Rubin 1974).  
One standard approach to this problem applies statistical matching techniques to balance the 
distribution of individual characteristics between the groups of treated and non-treated indi-
viduals. This method – that underlies also the empirical analysis conducted in this paper – 
requires that all variables X, which determine the decision to join a program and the expected 
success of a program, are known and available. Conditioning on those variables, the expected 
outcome under non-treatment should not depend on the decision to join Y0 ^ D | X. If this 
„Conditional Independence Assumption” (CIA) holds, the ATT is given by 
(2)  DATT = E(Y1 – Y0 | D =1) = E(Y1 | X, D =1) – E(Y0 | X, D = 0). 
Furthermore, the “Common Support Condition” requires that each treated individual has a 
positive probability not to be in a program, which guarantees that all of them have a counter-
part in the group of non-participants.   
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The most common approach used in the evaluation of European labor market policies has been 
suggested by Sianesi (2002, 2004) and uses a narrow classification window. The underlying 
idea is that European labor market programs are ongoing and any unemployed is a potential 
participant. Individuals will join sooner or later provided they are still eligible. The treatment 
group  consists  of  all  individuals  “joining”  a  program  during  a  chosen  time  interval.  Non-
participants are defined as “waiting” in the sense that they do not take up treatment until the 
beginning  of  the  evaluation  period,  but  eventually  at a later date. Frederiksson/Johansson 
(2004) characterize this as a time-varying treatment indicator. To formalize this, let the ATT be 
given more specifically as 
(3)  DATT
t+h, JW = E(Y1
t+h | X, D
t =1) – E(Y0
t+h | X, D
t = 0) 
where t is the timing of treatment and t+h the point of time when the outcome is observed (in 
this paper t will be March 2003 and h will be 3 ½ years). This “joining versus waiting” ap-
proach has been adopted for instance in a comprehensive evaluation of recent German labor 
market reforms (Deutscher Bundestag 2006). The estimated effects display the advantage of 
joining at a given time compared to waiting longer and are useful for testing for the existence 
of a treatment effect (see Frederiksson/Johansson 2004, Proposition 4). But they do not isolate 
the effect of a single intervention and are thus not suited for a cost-benefit analysis.  
Note that Sianesi (2004) in implementing this approach stratifies her sample by duration of 
unemployment in months. An alternative is to condition the choice of the comparison group 
on the duration of unemployment up to program entry. This requires, however, computing a 
“hypothetical” program entry date for potential comparison persons. 
An entirely different approach uses an extremely wide classification window for the choice of 
potential control persons and to define non-treatment as no treatment during the entire ob-
servation period. The corresponding average treatment effect on the treated has been charac-
terized by Steiger (2004) as “joining versus never in any program” and might be written as 
(4)  DATT
t+h, JN =  E(Y1
t+h | X, D
t =1)  
     – E(Y0
t+h | X, D
t = 0, D
t+1 = 0, …, D
t+h = 0). 
The idea of this approach is to imitate a social experiment, in which randomly chosen partici-
pants are assigned to treatment while members of a randomly chosen control group will not 
receive treatment. It has been used for instance by US-studies where a program is adminis-
tered  at  fixed  point  in  time  and  individuals  are  either  treated  or  not  treated.  With  non-
experimental data, however, the timing of program participation in an unemployment spell 
cannot be assumed to be random. Suppose that people do not enter a program because they 
expect to find a job soon. Then selecting a comparison group of individuals, who never partici-
pated in any program, bases selection on expected (successful) future outcomes. Thus match-
ing conditional on observable individual characteristics might not suffice to remove selectivity 
(Sianesi 2002, 2004, Fredriksson/Johansson 2004, Proposition 1).  
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As has already been mentioned in the introduction, a comparison between the “waiting” and 
the “never in any program” concepts has been conducted by Steiger (2004), who analyzed 
entries in Swiss active labor market programs. She obtained positive effects of most programs 
compared to non-treatment in the “joining versus waiting” context, but negative effects of 
almost all programs compared to non-treatment in the “joining versus never in any program” 
context. There are at least two possible explanations. On the one hand, those who were never 
in any program may be in fact a positive selection from all individuals. This is the aspect high-
lighted in the theoretical literature. However, on the other hand they may have the advantage 
to experience no lock-in effects at all from later participation. In contrast, the treatment 
group is not only locked-in during participation, but partly also during additional later treat-
ment, if “program careers” evolve. This aspect has rather been neglected in the literature, but 
might be in particular important if programs are rather long and the observation period is 
rather short. 
Thus, I will also apply a third concept in the following, suggested by the empirical fact that 
program careers are a non-trivial issue. The underlying idea is that the “joining versus never in 
any program” applies a restriction only to future outcomes of comparison group members, but 
not to those of participants. Both problems mentioned above might be partly resolved if we 
introduce a weaker, but similar restriction also to the group of participants, thus applying the 
classification window for the definition of non –treatment also to the future of the treatment 
group. In other words we will estimate the effect of “joining once versus never in any pro-
gram”. Let s be the duration of the first program, with s < h. Then the effect is given by 
(5)  DATT
t+h, ON =  E(Y1
t+h | X, D
t =1, D
t+s+1 = 0, ..., D
t+h = 0)  
    – E(Y0
t+h | X, D
t = 0, D
t+1 = 0, …, D
t+h = 0).  
While the second approach bases the selection of comparison persons on their (successful) 
future outcomes, the third concept additionally bases the selection of participants on the fact 
that they have not participated in a further program during the observation period. The draw-
backs are, however, that the analysis is restricted on selected subgroups of individuals and 
that the approach neglects that program participation itself might induce participation in 
further programs. 
Finally, it should be noted that the identifying assumption of statistical matching techniques is 
that no unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the selection into programs and with out-
come variables remains after accounting for observable variables. In contrast, duration analy-
sis, in particular the timing-of-events approach (Abbring/van den Berg 2003, 2004), allows 
also for selection on unobserved characteristics. The drawback is that – in contrast to the non-
parametrical statistical matching approach – these models impose the identifying assumption 
that transition processes into labor market programs as well as across labor market states can 
be modeled as a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model. An applied comparison be-
tween a dynamic matching estimator and the timing-of-events approach has been conducted 
by Lalive et al. (2008) for Swiss labor market programs.  
IAB-Discussion Paper 12/2008  15 
4  Data, variables, and applied method 
The empirical analysis utilizes the TrEffeR data set (Stephan et al. 2006), which has been con-
structed for monitoring purposes of the German Public Employment Service. The current ver-
sion merges data flows from the distinct computer based operative systems of the Public Em-
ployment Service on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment, participation 
in labor market programs and employment for the period 2000 to 2007. Note that the data of 
the Public Employment Service are partly incomplete since 2005 as a consequence of the al-
ready mentioned last “Hartz” labor market reform, which re-allocated responsibilities for long-
term unemployed persons between the Public Employment Service and local municipalities. 
Data flows from several local municipalities (“Optierende Kommunen”) opting out of the co-
operation with the Public Employment Service have not been entirely integrated yet. For indi-
viduals from these municipalities we cannot distinguish between times of unemployment and 
programs and other times out of the labor force. However, information on times in regular 
employment – the outcome variable utilized in this paper – is available also for these persons.  
The sample analyzed here covers all individuals who were unemployed for up to one year in 
March 2003 and of age 25 to 59. This selection excludes individuals eligible for specific pro-
grams for youth unemployed, while older workers may be eligible for early retirement schemes. 
The distance to the previous unemployment spell has to amount to at least one month. All 
estimates are performed separately for West and East Germany.  
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, the treatment groups consist of individuals 
who took up one of the following labor market programs of short or medium length during 
March 2003: a) Participation in the most common variant of further vocational training, aimed 
at the provision of specific professional skills (in the Tables and Figures abbreviated as “provi-
sion of skills”). b) Treatment within a practice firm, another variant of further vocational train-
ing that offers practical training without trainees working in a real company. c) Short firm-
external classroom training imparting qualifications and abilities, with an average of about 1 
½ months. d) Short firm-internal training, also imparting qualifications and abilities, with an 
average duration of about one month. e) A wage subsidy for hard-to-place workers, covering 
up to 50 percent of the wage and paid to the employers. f) Participation in a public job crea-
tion scheme (“Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahme”). Note that case managers in local employment 
agencies have latitude in the decision to grant participation in one of these programs. For all 
programs except the short training programs only treatments with duration of 4 to 6 months 
are taken into account. The underlying assumption is that a program is not characterized by its 
type but also by its length. Following the majority of the literature, only the effect of the first 
treatment during an unemployment spell is analyzed. 
Overview 2 gives a graphical impression of the evaluation designs used. In the first and second 
design the treatment group includes all individuals who took-up one of the programs investi-
gated in March 2003 (“joining”), while in the third design considers only those, who started 
their only program during the observation period of 3 ½ years in March 2003 (“joining once”). 
Non-treatment is defined as not entering treatment during March 2003 – but maybe later  
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during the observation period – in the first design (“waiting”) and as not entering any program 
during the 3 ½ years after March 2003 in the second and third design (“never in any pro-
gram”). I do not apply stratification by unemployment duration, but condition on unemploy-
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Note that program participation will be slightly under-recorded in the sample investigated 
since we have no information on program participation for long-term unemployed individuals 
from local municipalities opting out of the co-operation with the Public Employment Service 
since the beginning of 2005. However, results are very similar, if the sample investigated is 
restricted to local labor markets without such local municipalities. Furthermore, while different 
variants of contracting-out to private placement agencies started already in the year 1998 
(contracting-out of subtasks) respectively 2002 (contracting-out of entire placement tasks), no 
information on participation has been included in the data prior to 2004. Information on re-
ceipt of a placement voucher is not available in the data at all. 
The outcome variable utilized here are cumulated days spent in regular, unsubsidized employ-
ment during the 3 ½ years after program entry in March 2003 for participants. Since the clas-
sification window encompasses only one month, cumulated days for non-treatment groups are 
measured since March 15, 2003, and all individuals who had already left unemployment at this 
date were excluded from the sample. 
The choice of comparison groups is based on the following variables, which are all categorized 
as dummy variables: a) Socio-demographic characteristics, measured at the start of an unem-
ployment spell: Age, marital status, nationality, education and degree of disablement. b) Un-
employment duration in the current spell, measured in months, until program entry in March 
2003  for  participants  respectively  until  March  15,  2003  for  matched  comparison  persons. 
c) Variables describing the employment-history in the both years preceding the analyzed un- 
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employment spell, measured at the start of the unemployment spell: Former unemployment, 
participation in labor market programs, sanctions and periods of illness. d) Information on the 
regional labor market situation: Performance cluster of the regional labor market (Blien et al. 
2004). Mean values of selected explaining variables can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
A non-testable assumption underlying the statistical matching technique is the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA), which states that – conditioning on the explaining variables – 
the expected outcome under treatment and under non-treatment should not differ across 
treated and controls. The variables available allow controlling for a wide range of individual 
characteristics, including past experiences with the Public Employment Service. Thus unob-
served individual heterogeneity should not be a serious problem for the analysis, since the data 
include also information on previous employment histories, which should capture most of the 
effects of unobserved individual factors (Heckman et. al 1999). However, for wage subsidies as 
well as short firm-internal training measures also labor demand side factors will influence 
access to subsidized jobs as well as the probability of further employment. The matching of 
workers to heterogeneous firms, together with the lack of information on employer character-
istics  may  therefore  produce  a  bias  in  the  estimates  because  of  firm  heterogeneity 
(Jaenichen/Stephan 2007). Thus results for both programs should be taken with caution.  
The applied method is a so called nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score with ties 
and  replacement.  A  useful  simplification  of  matching  on  a  high-dimensional  vector  of  X-
variables is given by propensity-score matching. Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) have shown that it 
is sufficient to match on the propensity score Pr(X) = Pr(D = 1|X) to obtain the same probabil-
ity  distribution  for  treated  and  non-treated  individuals.  Thus,  if  (Y0,Y1  ^  D)  |  X  holds,  
(Y0,Y1 ^ D) | Pr(X) will also be satisfied. For treated persons, all non-treated individuals, whose 
propensity scores have the smallest distance to that of the treated person, are chosen as com-
parisons. Replacement implies that potential comparison group members can be used as com-
parisons for more than one treated person. The program impact is estimated as the mean dif-
ference in the weighted outcomes of both groups, where a weighting is applied to comparison 
persons if one treated person has more than one comparison person. 
Estimates are performed using the stata-module psmatch2 (Leuven/Sianesi 2003). To test for 
the quality of matching the mean standardized bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983) between 
each treated group and its matched comparison group is computed across all variables from X. 
The standardized bias of a covariate is defined as the difference of means in the treated and 
matched control sample, divided by the square root of the average sample variance. Thus a 
lower value of the MSB indicates more similarity between the two groups. 
5  Empirical results 
Figure 1 summarizes the main results of the analysis – the average treatment effect on cumu-
lated days spent in regular employment 3 ½ years after program entry in March 2003. The 
change of effects over time is displayed in detail in Figure A.1 in the Appendix, which shows 
clearly in particular the lock-in effects arising during program participation.   
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Figure 1 
Estimated effects on cumulated days in regular employment 3 ½ years after program entry 
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Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
 
Additional information can be found in Table 2, which also shows cumulated days spent in 
regular employment during the observation period for treated persons (T) and matched com-
parison persons (C). For instance, if we apply the “joining versus waiting” approach, individuals 
participating in further vocational training providing skills in West Germany were 483 days of 
1260 days in regular employment, while comparable persons not entering a program during 
March 2003 were employed for 400 days. The estimated treatment effect is significant positive 
and amounts to 83 days – nearly three months. Furthermore, Table 2 contains the mean stan-
dardized bias (MSB) before and after matching as well as the bias reduction through matching. 
The  latter  results  will  not  be  discussed  further,  but  indicate a rather  good quality of the 
matching.  
As can be seen most clearly from Figure 1, estimated effects differ systematically across pro-
grams, slightly across both regions of Germany – and they depend strongly on the classifica-
tion window chosen. In what follows I will first discuss results by program, starting with the 
most “positive” programs. Second, results for West and East Germany are compared briefly. 
Third, the importance of the classification window chosen will be explored in detail.  
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Table 2 
Cumulated days in regular employment during the 3 ½ years after program entry in March 2003 
for treated persons (T) and matched comparison persons (C), average estimated treatment effects 
on the treated (ATT), mean standardized bias (MSB) before and after matching, bias reduction 
through matching, average duration of treatment and number of observations 
Average
T C Before After Red. duration Obs.
Joining vs. waiting 483 400 83 ** 10.0 2.7 0.73 149 1414
Joining vs. never 483 461 22 10.8 2.8 0.75 149 1414
Joining once vs. never 585 447 138 ** 11.8 2.4 0.80 151 713
Joining vs. waiting 571 450 121 ** 12.1 3.4 0.72 147 432
Joining vs. never 572 571 0 12.5 3.7 0.71 147 432
Joining once vs. never 720 572 148 ** 14.0 5.3 0.62 146 171
Joining vs. waiting 435 423 12 13.8 3.7 0.73 155 401
Joining vs. never 435 444 -9 14.3 3.1 0.78 155 401
Joining once vs. never 499 464 34 14.0 6.5 0.54 158 188
Joining vs. waiting 460 397 63 10.4 4.5 0.57 150 163
Joining vs. never 460 479 -19 11.7 5.5 0.53 150 163
Joining once vs. never 599 507 92 14.0 8.1 0.42 145 60
Joining vs. waiting 417 395 22 ** 9.8 1.7 0.83 46 5716
Joining vs. never 417 443 -26 ** 10.4 1.8 0.83 46 5716
Joining once vs. never 502 443 60 ** 11.4 1.9 0.83 48 2698
Joining vs. waiting 411 399 13 6.1 2.3 0.63 39 2403
Joining vs. never 411 500 -89 ** 7.3 2.1 0.72 39 2403
Joining once vs. never 555 490 65 ** 6.1 3.0 0.51 40 808
Joining vs. waiting 636 441 195 ** 9.2 1.9 0.79 33 3135
Joining vs. never 636 510 126 ** 10.5 1.7 0.84 33 3135
Joining once vs. never 806 521 285 ** 10.8 3.0 0.72 34 1502
Joining vs. waiting 638 424 214 ** 9.5 2.7 0.72 23 1057
Joining vs. never 638 547 92 ** 10.8 2.8 0.74 23 1057
Joining once vs. never 853 549 304 ** 10.5 3.7 0.65 23 383
Joining vs. waiting 673 352 321 ** 13.4 2.8 0.79 167 734
Joining vs. never 673 408 265 ** 15.4 3.0 0.81 167 734
Joining once vs. never 787 440 347 ** 14.9 3.2 0.79 169 506
Joining vs. waiting 670 299 372 ** 13.8 3.9 0.72 172 345
Joining vs. never 670 433 237 ** 15.5 3.4 0.78 172 345
Joining once vs. never 823 434 389 ** 14.9 4.6 0.69 177 230
Joining vs. waiting 296 279 17 18.7 3.4 0.82 172 449
Joining vs. never 296 336 -40 19.1 3.7 0.81 172 449
Joining once vs. never 409 351 58 18.1 6.1 0.66 169 186
Joining vs. waiting 237 278 -42 * 14.6 2.7 0.82 175 792
Joining vs. never 237 356 -119 ** 14.0 3.4 0.76 175 792
Joining once vs. never 293 338 -44 15.7 3.4 0.78 177 351































*)  a = 0.05     **)  a = 0.01.  
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
 
These results regarding the particular programs are so far in line with the literature cited in 
Section 2. Persistent positive treatment effects are found for hard-to-place individuals who 
received a wage subsidy. Short firm-internal training programs also exert a significant positive 
impact on cumulated days of regular employment. However, as has already been mentioned in 
Section 4, the estimates for both programs may partly suffer from selectivity at the firms’ side. 
For further vocational training providing skills, the estimated treatment effects are – depend-
ing on the classification window chosen – either significantly positive or insignificant. For 
those who receive a treatment within a practice firm, insignificant effects are found. Short 
classroom training programs has partly positive, partly insignificant and partly negative effects 
on cumulated days of regular employment – again dependent on the underlying classification 
window. Finally, estimated treatment effects are insignificant or negative for those working in 
public job creation schemes.   
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Most programs investigated perform slightly better for persons treated in East Germany than 
for participants in West Germany. This is to a huge extent the result of the poor labor market 
situation in East Germany (especially for women), with generally worse opportunities to leave 
unemployment for comparison group members compared to West Germany. One noticeable 
exception is treatment in public job creation schemes, whose effectiveness for the treated is 
lower in East Germany.  
Let us now turn to the main topic of the paper, the relationship between the size of the classi-
fication window and estimated program effectiveness. To give an example, comparing partici-
pants in further vocational training providing skills in West Germany with a matched group of 
“waiting” persons, we estimate that treated persons have spent a significant length of time, 
specifically 83 days or almost 3 months, more in regular employment during the 3 ½ years 
after program start. However, the program effect shrinks to an insignificant 22 days if we 
compare participants with a group of comparison persons who have never entered any pro-
gram during the observation period. If, however, we restrict the analysis additionally to treated 
persons, who took-up no further program during the observation period, the estimated treat-
ment effect increases again – to significantly positive 138 days spent more in regular employ-
ment.  
The overall picture is similar: Table 2 shows that estimated effects are always lowest and in 
most cases negative if the classification window encompasses the entire observation period, 
while no restriction is put on the future of the treatment group (“joining versus never in any 
program”). In contrast, estimated effects are more positive, when the classification window 
encompasses only one month and no further restrictions on the future of the treated and the 
comparison persons are applied (“joining versus waiting”). 
Why does the “never in any program” comparison group perform better in the market than the 
“waiting” comparison group? First, as has been already discussed in Section 3, Sianesi (2004) 
and Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) argue that the former are a selected group of unemployed 
who did not enter a program because they did expect to find a job soon anyway. Also case-
workers might find that these persons are not in need of participation. Hence the decision to 
participate may be the result of an adverse selection process, and future unemployment pros-
pects partly explain the decision to participate during the observation period. This would imply 
that the Conditional Independence Assumption might not hold.  
Second, participation in active labor market programs is in most cases associated with a sig-
nificant lock-in-effect due to reduced search activity. In the “waiting” context the treatment 
group would then be compared with a comparison group that partly experiences lock-in ef-
fects from treatment also – only later. The later during the observation period the entry into a 
program occurs, the lower is the probability that positive program effects will outweigh these 
lock-in effects. The “never in any program” group has ex post avoided such lock-in effects. This 
argument will hold even if ex ante no unobserved heterogeneity is present.  
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Both effects cannot be disentangled empirically. Both raise, however, the question, how many 
of those “waiting” do in fact enter a program later during the observation period. Also indi-
viduals entering a program in March 2003 may enter another program during this period. That 
in particular short programs are often followed by further program participation has already 
been shown by Wunsch/Lechner (2008), who described further program participation of par-
ticipants and non-participants in their sample. 
Table 3 shows for treated and comparison persons, which share of each group enters further 
treatment during the 3 ½ years after program start (as has been depicted in Section 4, these 
shares might be even slightly underestimated). For instance, 49 percent of those taking-up 
further vocational training providing skills in West Germany in March 2003 received at least 
one further treatment during the 3 ½ years following. The first further program starting after 
March 2003 was in most cases – 22 percentage points – a short training program (while even 
32 percentage points of the treatment group participated in such a measure during the entire 
observation period sooner or later). In contrast, “only” 37 percent of the matched comparison 
group took part in a labor market program after March 2003. Most of them – 18 percentage 
points – also participated first in a short training measure, while altogether 25 percentage 
points joined such a program at all.  
The main contents of Table 3 are also summarized in Figure 2. It gives the impression that 
“program careers” occur rather often: Around 50 to 70 percent of those taking-up a program 
in March 2003 also had at least one further program during the observation period. In contrast 
the share of matched comparison persons participating in a program later on is generally 10 to 
20 percentage points lower. The only exception is found for those who took up subsidized em-
ployment – the share found in further measures is only around 30 percent and 10 to 20 per-
centage points lower than across their matched control persons. 
The results show clearly that both treatment effects discussed so far for those “joining” a pro-
gram do not isolate the effect of a single intervention. If we restrict the sample to treated 
individuals who joined a program only once (in March 2003) and to potential comparison per-
sons who never entered any program during the observation period, we obtain the third treat-
ment  effect  displayed  in  Table  1  (“joining  once  versus  never  in  any  program”).  Estimated 
treatment effects are typically highest if this wide classification window for the definition of 
non-treatment as well as for the identification of an “isolated” treatment is used. This effect is 
not distorted by further interventions for treated as well as for comparison persons and makes 
both groups investigated more similar. However, now also the treatment group will consist of 
a selected group of individuals, who did expect or were expected by caseworkers to find a job 
without entering a further program. 
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Table 3 























































Treated 0.49 0.03 0.05 0.22 0.32 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.15
Comparison 0.37 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.12
Treated 0.60 0.08 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.16
Comparison 0.49 0.03 0.05 0.22 0.35 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.07 0.11
Treated 0.54 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.38 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.14
Comparison 0.36 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10
Treated 0.63 0.07 0.12 0.33 0.52 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.11
Comparison 0.48 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.22 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.13
Treated 0.53 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.35 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.12
Comparison 0.35 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.11
Treated 0.66 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.46 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.05 0.13
Comparison 0.48 0.04 0.05 0.21 0.31 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.06 0.11
Treated 0.52 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.37 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.10
Comparison 0.37 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.10
Treated 0.64 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.44 0.22 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.09
Comparison 0.49 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.33 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.07 0.12
Treated 0.31 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.08
Comparison 0.44 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.13
Treated 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.11
Control 0.56 0.02 0.05 0.27 0.37 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.13
Treated 0.59 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.30 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.31 0.10 0.15
Comparison 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.07 0.11
Treated 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.34 0.08 0.13
Control 0.48 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.28 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.06 0.11
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Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
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Figure 2 
Share of treated persons entering at least one further program and of comparison persons 
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Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
 
All estimates have been replicated also for the outcome variable “cumulated days not in un-
employment and not in a labor market program”, restricting the analysis on the group of indi-
viduals from local labor markets without a municipality opting out of the co-operation with 
the Public Employment Service (see section 4). Even though estimated treatment effects are 
smaller than those found for the outcome variable “cumulated days in regular employment”, as 
is often the case (see section 2), the results show exactly the same pattern: Estimated treat-
ment effects depend strongly on the classification window chosen for the definition of non-
treatment, with more positive results for a small than for a wide classification window. 
6  Conclusions 
The decision for a classification window that defines treatment and non-treatment is a crucial 
issue in evaluation studies of active labor market programs. Whereas a social experiment al-
lows for a random assignment of individuals to treatment and control group, a major chal-
lenge of observation studies is to control for selection mechanisms. A broader classification 
window might easily introduce selection on future expected outcomes of participants. This 
paper estimated the program effects for participants in different German labor market pro-
grams empirically, applying one very small (one month) and one very wide (3 ½ years) classifi-
cation window. 
Since results are sensitive to the choice of the classification window, a main conclusion of the 
paper is that researchers should be careful in interpreting the results of evaluation studies of 
active labor market programs using statistical matching techniques: The meaning of estimated  
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treatment effects as well as the size of estimated effects hinge strongly on the choice of 
treatment and comparison group. This is in particularly obvious for training programs. These 
programs have been shown to have typically rather weak effects. Thus the design of the study 
could make the difference between obtaining significant positive, insignificant or negative 
effects. Thus authors of evaluation studies should spend some effort to describe their classifi-
cation  window chosen very clearly and to discuss the implications of this aspect of their 
evaluation design. 
The paper demonstrates also that none of the approaches applied here is appropriate to isolate 
the effect of a certain program and at the same time to avoid selectivity: The “joining versus 
waiting” design has become more and more common in the evaluation of active labor market 
policies in Europe. Its drawback is that it cannot be used to isolate the effects of a single in-
tervention, which also prevents a clear analysis of efficiency of the program – members of the 
treatment as well of the comparison group may enter other programs later, which might in-
duce further costs. In contrast, the “joining versus never in any program” design, which com-
pares treated persons with those entering no program at all during the observation period, 
might be prone to unobserved heterogeneity on the side of the comparison group. Finally, the 
“joining once versus never in any program” design introduces a similar restraint for program 
participants. Thus unobserved selectivity will be partly removed across treatment and compari-
son groups investigated – but estimates are not valid for the entire number of program par-
ticipants. 
A  further  result  of  the  paper  is  that  program  careers  are  an  important  and  still  under-
researched issue. For most programs investigated here, the majority of participants enter at 
least one further program during the 3 ½ years after taking-up a program in March 2003. 
Several recent papers deal with dynamic treatment assignment (Adda et al. 2006, Lechner 
2004, 2006, Lechner/Wiehler 2007b), the literature in this field is, however, still sparse. 
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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables 
Figure A.1 
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Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. Only effects significant at a = 0.05 are displayed.   




Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) for treated and potential comparison 
persons with (I) and without (II) participation in labor market measures during the 3 ½ years 
after March 2003 
West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East
Female 0.47 0.32 0.56 0.40 0.55 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.45
Age 26-30 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.11
Age 31-35 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.13
Age 36-8 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15
Age 41-45 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16
Age 46-50 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.16
Age 51-54 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14
Age 55-59 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14
Health problems 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.11
Slightly disabeled 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Severly disabeled 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
Married 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.64 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.71 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.59
Married and female 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.27 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.30
Foreigner 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02
Secondary degree (Hauptschule) 0.40 0.16 0.46 0.13 0.40 0.21 0.47 0.18 0.51 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.52 0.30 0.53 0.30
Secondary degree (Realschule) 0.29 0.67 0.34 0.68 0.27 0.65 0.28 0.67 0.23 0.69 0.34 0.56 0.19 0.57 0.19 0.56
Secondary degree (Gymnasium) 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.08
Vocational training 0.62 0.85 0.71 0.83 0.61 0.84 0.69 0.87 0.60 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.54 0.82 0.54 0.83
University degree 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
1st month of unemployment 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12
2nd month of unemployment 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12
3rd month of unemployment 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18
4th month of unemployment 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
5th month of unemployment 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
6th month of unemployment 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
7th month of unemployment 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
8th month of unemployment 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
9th month of unemployment 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
10th month of unemployment 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
11th month of unemployment 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
12th month of unemployment 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Unemployed up to 1 month 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.63 0.49 0.53 0.42 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.45 0.28 0.47 0.30
Unemployed 1-6 months 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19
Unemployed 7-12 months 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.22
Unemployed 13-18 months 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.17
Unemployed 19-24 months 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13
Labor market measure 0.21 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.46 0.71 0.35 0.39 0.21 0.42 0.17 0.36
Period of sickness 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.20







































































































































































Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. Recently published 
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